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This paper investigates  the impact  of labor  market  regulations  in a setting  with incomplete  compliance. It takes  as
its starting  point  the limited  evidence  regarding  the  distortionary  costs of labor market  regulations  and argues  that
there may  exist natural limits to the efficiency  losses  engendered  by such regulations. The paper  reviews some
stylized  facts  regarding  labor  market  behaviour,  presents  an analytical  model  which  may  explain  such behaviour,
and provides  a checklist  for assessing  the distortionary  impact  of such regulations  as minimum  wages.
This paper reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily  those of the World Bank or its affiliated
organizations.  We gratefully  acknowledge  Ahmed  Galal, Dipak  Mazuimdar,  Branko  Milanovic  and Martin  Rama
and participants  at a WDR  seminar for comments  and Marcel  Fratzscher  for research  assistance.I.  INTRODUCTION
Does labor market regulation in developing countries result in  significant efficiency
losses? In his survey paper Freeman (1992)  expressed surprise that there was not more evidence
on  the distortionary costs of  labor market regulation:  "The first  surprise was that studies
designed to support the distortionist view of labor  markets in developing  countries failed to make
a stronger empirical case than they did" (p.139).
There are several possible explanations  for this result.  First, the regulations may not be
binding at the market equilibrium.  Second,  even if they are binding, the relevant elasticities of
supply and demand may be so low that their impact on efficiency is small.  And third, even if
the regulations are binding and the elasticities are sizable, compliance may be low.'  In this
paper we focus on the third reason and argue that:
-*  The likelihood of noncompliance will be greatest when the regulatons
are binding and the relevant elasticities are sizable.
That  is,  if the distortionary costs of regulations are not rendered insignificant  by the first two
reasons, then the returns to noncompliance  will be high and, other things being equal, employers
will either evade or avoid the regulations thereby minimizing the impact on efficiency.
The argument obviously depends on a comparison of  the returns to  noncompliance
(increased profits) relative to its costs (penalties  or transaction costs) and presumes some fonn
of  profit-maximizing behavior subject to  tight  budget constraints.  This  might be  a  fair
approximation to the private sector reality of developing  countries but in many instances public
sector enterprises have been an important form of industrial organization and it can be argued
On this point,  Freeman (1992) notes that 'If extensive  unemployment  results, the minimum will often
be unenforceable because both workers and employers  will have incentives  to collude to avoid the law
and save jobs'  (p.  128).that such enterprises are not concerned exclusively  with profit maximization  and frequently face
very soft budget constraints.  This suggests that public enterprises may be more willing to
conform with profit-reducing regulations.  But, we will argue that the very same factors leading
to this outcome may also imply that compliance  does not have the efficiency costs that arise in
the case of private producers.  The second proposition  explored in this paper therefore is.
*  Although more likely to comply with labor market  regulations,  public
enterprise  compliance may actually reduce efficiency losses.
Taken together, the two propositions suggest that natural limits exist to the efficiency losses
engendered by labor market regulations.
For concreteness of discussion, the paper focusses on minimum wage legislation.  The
approach, however, could be easily recast to deal with other forms of intervention  (hiring and
firing regulations for example).  The procedure followed is to review some empirical evidence
and stylized facts regarding labor market behavior and then provide an analytical  model which
may explain such behavior.  The goal is to provide a framework and checklist for assessing the
distortionary impact of such labor market regulations  as minimum wages and for selecting case
studies for future in-depth research. 2
The remainder of the paper comprises four sections.  Section II outlines recent trends in
minimum wages throughout  the developing world. Against  this background, Section m  explores
the first propos'  uion. It focusses on private sector behavior  and: provides empirical  evidence and
stylized facts regarding non-compliance;  derives  an analytical  explanation  for such behavior; and
establishes the conditions under which the distortionary  impact is likely to be high.  Section IV
This is consistent  with Freeman's (1992)  conclusion  that 'More can be learned....from  detailed  case
studies  than  from cross-country  time series  regression  with weak  data" (p. 139).3
fulfills  the same function  for the second  proposition. The final section  summarizes  by means
of a checklist  for assessing  the likely  distortionary  impact  of mininum wage  legislation.
IH. RccETr TRENDS
The view that  real minimum  wages  consistently  rose  in the seventies  and consistently  fell
in the eighties  is not fully  borne out  by the available  data (see  Table  1). The conventional  view
is most accurate  in the case of Latin  America. Although  it is difficult  to observe  any trend in
the seventies,  real minirnum  wages  did fall throughout  most of the region  in the eighties  and in
some  cases  by substantial  amounts  -by about  one half  to one third in most countries. A similar
picture might emerge for Africa were more data available. As it is, the evidence  reveals  a
mixed  picture  in both the seventies  and eighties  and even  where  there are declines  in the eighties
the fall is much  less than in Latin  America  -only about  20 percent. A ielatively  stable  situation
emerges  for the three Asian  countries  - movements  up and down stay  within  20 percent  of the
1980  base.4
Table 1:  Real Minimum Wages: 1970-90
Region  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990
Latin America
Argentina  182  185  100  113  50
Bolivia  99  130  33  31
Brazil  90  94  100  84  51
Chile  64  61  100  63  88
Colombia  77  78  100  108  107
Costa Rica  88  77  100  112  121
Ecuador  49  51  100  61  44
Guatemala  118  96  100  85  61
Honduras  122  100  90  74
Mexico  91  91  100  67  42
Nicaragua  119  100  47
Panama  119  116  100  101  99
Paraguay  151  140  100
Peru  118  115  100  54  21
Uruguay  124  143  100  94  69
Venezuela  85  100  95  65
Ada
Philippines  101  65  100  82  83
SriLanka  73  84  100  94
Thailand  84  100  117  117
Africa
Algeria  56  69  100
Benin  143  100  91
Botswana  85  100  113
Burkina Faso  79  87  100  87  101
Congo  157  100  96
Cote d'lv6ire  104  114  100  84
Gabon  90  107  100  90  84
Ghana  415  509  100  144  114
Kenya  119  121  100  68
Malawi  . 119  100  120
Mauritius  . 100  104
Morocco  98  100  118  132
Niger  87  100  70  81
Senegal  99  111  100  78  78
Togo  143  131  100  80  80
Tunisia  77  100  110  100
Zaire  805  599  100  164
Source: Anker. R., T. Butare  and A. Marinakis. 1992.  "Miniimum  Wages in Developing  Countries:  Trends and Determinants."5
A more interesting  statistic for present purposes, however, is the clhange  in the minimum
wage relative to the distribution of wages in the economy.  As a crude indication of this, Table
2 reports the growth of the real minimum and average  manufacturing wage.  It reveals that in
most countries during the 1980s, minimum wages have becorrm  less binding - only 5 out of 17
countries  had real minimum wages growing faster than real average wages.  What is also
noteworthy is that this appears to have been brought about by falling real minimum wages than
by rising real average wages.
Table  2: Percentage  Changes  in Real  Average  and Minimum  Wages
Average  Mtinimum
(1)  (2)  (1) - (2)
s~un  America  tiYM/!Bf
Argentina  -0.5  20.8  -21.3
Brazil  2.3  -35.3  37.6
Chile  -6  -42.4  36.4
Colombia  19.3  13  6.3
Costa  Rica  -7.7  18.1  -25.8
Guatamela  -22.7  -38.9  16.2
Honduras  -8  -16  8
Mexico  -43.3  43.17  8.4
Paraguay  -1.9  20  -21.9
Peru  -10.8  -39.2  28.4
Uruguay  14  10.9  3.1
Africa (1980)
Burundi  4.74  -3.53  10.7
Kenya  40.6  54.6  -14
Mauritius  -22.8  41.2  18.4
Malawi  3.7  -24  27.7
Asia (19808
Sri Lanka  -11.4  -6.2  -5.2
Thailand  86.4  12.2  74.2
Source: ILO (1990).  Wages,  Labour  Costs  and  their Impact  on Adjustment.  Employment  and Growth.III.  PRIVATE  SECMOR  RESPONSE
This section  establishes  that there exist natural  limits  to the impact  of minimum  wage
legislation  because  of incomplete  compliance  by private  firms. For the purpose  of this paper,
impact  is defined  as a change  in the demand  for labor. An increase  in a perfectly  enforced  and
binding  minimum  wage would lead  unambiguously  to a fall in the demand  for labor.  With
incomplete  compliance,  the demand  for  labor  could  fall, remain  constant,  or even  increase. This
section  identifies  the circumstances  in which  these different  outcomes  will hold.
The Facts
Fact 1: The extent of noncompliance  with minimum  wage  regulations  is widespread
and  significant. The  evidence  indicates  that noncompliance  occurs  in a variety  of countries  and
is significant  even among developed  countries  with the proper apparatus--established  book-
keeping  and reporting  procedures,  for example--for  regulatory  enforcement. 3 Analyzing  1973
data  for the United  States  Ashenfelter  and Smith (1979)  find  that among  those  who would  have
earned  less than the minimum  in the absence  of legislation,  only 64 percent  were in compliance
with  the legislation.  For California  in 1989,  Card (1991)  found  that noncompliance  was as high
as 46 percent if one considers  only those workers directly affected by the increase  of the
minimum  wage. Turning  to developing  countries,  household  survey  data  for Mexico  reveal  that
in 1988 16 percent of all full-time  male workers  in the informal  sector were paid below the
minimum,  and as many as 66 percent of female  workers  in various  sectors (Bell, 1994).4  In
3  Non-compliance  is a general phenomenon  that applies  Eo a! mandated standards and taxes.  A focus on
labor  market  legislation  is warranted  because  the widespread  dispersion  of firms  makes  enforcement
especially  difficult  in this case.
This is significant  given  the large  size  of the informal  sector:  only 18.2%  of all enterprises  in 1988
were estimated  to have  been  fully  meeting  all legal  requirements  regarding  inscription  and contibutions
(Standing  and Tokman,  1991).7
Colombia, 4.7 percent of even large manufacturing  enterprises  in 1983  reported  not to comply
with the minimum  wage legislation  (Bell,  1994). In Morocco  more than 50 percent  of the finms
paid their unskilled  workers less than the minimum  wage in 1986 (Harrison, 1993).  In sub-
Saharan Africa, the extent of noncompliance  is even more striking.  A recent survey of 300
informal  sector  firms  in Niger revealed  that 293 did not comply  with  minimum  wage  regulations
(Morrison, 1993). In Swaziland, 242 out of 290 failed  to comply.
Fact 2:  The pattern of noncompliance  is consistent with the observation  that it
increases with the costs of compliance  and falls with  the costs of enforcement. Because  the
observed extent of non-compliance  represents  an equilibrium  response to both the costs of
compliance  and the costs of enforcement, it is difficult to disentangle  the two.  In certain
instances,  however, it may be possible to separately  identify  the two effects through careful
interpretation  of time-series  and cross-section  data coupled  with some assumptions.
There are several cases which indicate  that noncompliance  increases  with the costs of
compliance  for the firm. Considering  only those  people  directly  affected  by the minimum  wage,
noncompliance  with the minimum  wage in California rose from 31 percent in 1987 to 46
percent in 1989  with the increase in the minimum  wage from $3.35 to $4.25 per hour. 5 Since
the intensity  of enforcement  is not likely to have  changed  significantly  in such a short period of
time and median  wages rose only by 7.6 percent, much of the increase in noncompliance  is
likely to be due to the increased  costs of complying  with the higher minimum  wage. In Puerto
Rico, noncompliance  (in the entire population)  rose from around 20 percent in 1979 to 35
Noncompliance  in the entire population,  however,  was less that 2% (Card, 1991).H
percent in 1983 with the increase in the minimum from $2.56 to $3.35." Again, assuming that
the intensity of enforcement remained more or less the same, this suggests that noncomrliance
increased as the cost of compliance  to the firm increased. Conversely, in Mcxico noncompliance
decreased as the costs of noncompliance fell due to a fall in real minimum wages during the
1980s. The ratio of the minimum to average wage for blue collar workers fell from 0.42 to 0.34
from 1984 to 1989, while the percentage of large manufacturing f!rms paying average wages
below the minimum similarly fell from 3.0 to  1.9 percent (Bell, 1994). If the structure of
enforcement did not change markedly, this would indicate that noncompliance  fell along with
the decrease in the costs of complying with minimum wage regulations.'  In general, cross-
country comparisons  are clearly more problematic  since  the structure of enforcement could differ
significantly across countries.  However, since the enforcement  system in both California and
Puerto Rico are under the U.S. Department  of Labor and are therefore likely to be similar,  the
significantly higher ratio of noncompliance in Puerto Rico could be attributed largely to  the
relative costs of compliance:  the ratio of minimum  to average  earnings was 63 percent in Puerto
Rico but only 34 percent in the U.S.  as a whole in 1987.
The pattern of noncompliance  is also consistent with the observation that it varies with
the ease of enforcement.  While it is unclear how enforcement costs vary over time, there are
sound reasons for believing  that they vary across the population  of firms and workers at a given
point in time.  For  example, because enforcement costs (on both a per firm as well as per
Noncompliance  in Puerto  Rico  is likely  to have  been  significantly  higher  if one considers  that only 64%
of the workers  were covered  by the minimum  wage  legislation  and those  workers  not covered  are
usually  employed  in the informal  setor  and smaller  enterprises  (see Freeman,  1992).
Indeed.  given  the increase  in the number  of firns over time, one would  expect  compliance  to fall
unless  the enforcement  budget  were increased  commensurately.9
worker basis) are likely to he higher lor small tirnmi  operating in the informal sector, it is not
surprising that we lind significantly higher noncompliance among this group. In Mexico, the
percentage of full-time male workers with wagcs below the minimum was over 16 percent in the
informal sector, but less than 3 percent in the lormnal  sector (Bell, 1994:.  In Morocco, wage
histograms  show  that  noncompliance among enterprises  with  less  than  20  employees  is
significantly higher than among larger enterprises (Harrison, 1993).
Of course, this pattern is also consistent with higher compliance costs for the firm."
Smaller, informal sector firms typically hire more unskilled labor than skilled, more younger
workers than older, and more women than men relative to larger firms in the formal sector. To
the extent that labor markets are segmented, these smaller, informal sector firms could face
higher efficiency losses from compliance since the average wage for these demographic groups
is  lower  and  their  elasticity of  labor demand higher.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising that
compliance is significantly lower among these demographic groups. In California  in 1987, 67
percent of those who earned less than the minimum  were 24 years of age or younger, 37 percent
were Hispanics and 67 percent were female (Card, 1991). In Mexico, despite a decline in real
minimum wages noncompliance  with the minimum remained significantly high in the informal
sector,  in  the  south,  among  women,  and  among  people  with  little  or  no  education.
Noncompliance in the south was 29 percent among full-time  workers in the informal sector but
only 8.2 percent among the same group in Mexico City. Noncompliance  among full-time male
workers in the informal sector with no education was 26.5 percent but only 2 percent for those
in the  same sector with education of  16 years and more (Bell, 1994). Wage histograms for
'he  two effects  are difficult  to distinguish  formally  without  structural  estimation.10
Morocco  also  show that noncompliance  among  unskilled  female  workers  is significantly  higher
than for men (Harrison, 1993).
While  cross-country  comparisons  do not  allow  the effects  of compliance  and enforcement
costs to be distinguished,  they can nonetheless  be revealing. Differences  in noncompliance
between  sub-Saharan  and other countries  are very striking.  In contrast  to the non-compliance
figures  for Niger and Swaziland  cited above,  the same  study  found  only 49 out of 503 firms in
Thailand,  and 29 out of 269 in Ecuador to be  in noncompliance  with minimum  wage
regulations  (Morrisson, 1993). That minimum  wages have considerably  less bite in Mexico
relative  to Colombia  also indicates  that the incentives  for noncompliance  are much  higher  in the
latter. Annual  industrial  surveys  for manufacturing  firms in both countries  show  that in Mexico
only 10 percent  of the firms reported  to pay average  blue collar wages less than 1.5 times  the
inimum wage  whereas  29 percent  of Colombian  firms  paid average  unskilled  wages  less than
1.5 times  the minimum  in 1986  (Bell, 1994).
Fact 3:  Firms can and do legally avoid minimum wage legislation. Widespread
noncompliance  is not surprising  in view  of the  mnerous  means  for avoiding  such regulations
in a manner much more difficult to detect than outright evasion. Many countries  exempt
teenagers, apprentices,  workers on training  and part-time  workers from the minimum  wage
legislation.  In Morocco, for instance,  fins  are allowed  to pay as little as 50 percent  and 80
percent  of the minimum  wage  for 14 or 15-year  olds  and 17 or 18-year  olds, respectively,  which
provides significant  incentives  for legal avoidance. The renewal  of temporary  contracts  is a
common form of avoiding compliance  in Mexico. This form of avoidance  is particularly
widespread  in large-scale  industries  and among such government  controlled  enterprises  as the
petroleum  monopoly,  which is probably  due to the fact that evasion  is more difficult  and risky1I
in these sectors and for these enterprises  (see Standing  and Tokman, 1991). The survey  of
informal  sector firms conducted  by Morrisson  (1993)  shows that even when firms formally
comply  with  minimum  wage  regulations  de jure, they  may avoid them  de facto by hiring "false
apprentices"  or failing  to pay overtime. In Jamaica,  Algeria  and Thailand  compliance  with the
miiinmum  wage  legislation  was significantly  higher  than compliance  with regulations  regarding
the payment  of overtime. In Jamaica,  while 58 percent of firms reported complying  with
minimum  wages,  only  21 percent  complied  with  the payment  of overtime.  Similarly,  in Algeria
and Thailand 54 percent  and 77 percent  complied  with miniimum  wages  while only  46 percent
and 64 percent,  respectively,  complied  with the payment  of overtime. 9
The Model
The patterns  of compliance  described  above  represent  equilibrium  outcomes  that reflect
both the behaviour  of private firms  and the regulator's  strategy  of enforcement. The analysis
of Ashenfelter  and Smith  (1979)  illustrates  this point  well. Their analytical  model  predicts  that
"firms employing  low-wage  workers  and for which wage  changes  produce  large employment
adjustments  have  the greatest  incentives  to violate  the law".  But, this incentive  "is more than
fully  offset  by the higher  probability  of government  detection  that results  from the government's
enforcement  strategy".
Instead of modelling  the full equilibrium,  the analysis presented  below captures the
interaction  between  firms and regulator  by assuming  that the former face a known  probability
of inspection. This approach is followed  for two reasons.  First, there is no empirically
established  view regarding the regulator's objective  function.  And second, fairly obvious
These  percentages  aTe  only  of firms  which  responded.12
candidates -- such as minimizing evasion or maximising  net financial returns from inspection --
lead to  little change in  the  analysis other than the  replacement of  a  known probability of
inspection by the distribution of enforcement costs by type of  finn  . We also suspect that
enforcement strategies are  severely circumscribed by  very few staff  resources and  limited
budgets.  This, however, is no more than a suspicion  which we hope to test by means of a small
survey of Departments of Labor in selected developing  countries.  Even in the case of the U.S.
Department of Labor, there are only 800 federal wage and hour inspectors nationwide to cover
about 2.6 million employers. In these circumstances,  many of the investigations  -- around three-
quarters  - are in response to complaints.  Inspection and enforcement are likely to be even
weaker in developing countries. In Bangladesh,  the 1991 annual report of the Ministry of Labor
and Manpower Inspectorate only mentions two investigations  under the Minimum Wages Act.
Neither  do  higher inspections necessarily translate into greater  enforcement.  While 411
violations were detected in 1988, 518 in 1989, and 610 in 1990, there were only 13 prosecutions
in 1990 and 3 in 1991. (World Bank, 1994).
It is also important to consider the nature of noncompliance.  Some firms may fail to
comply with minimum wage legislation by legal avoidance  while others may engage in outright
evasion.  Firms  following the former  route -- for example by  subcontracting, hiring  only
temporary workers or young workers to whom the legislation does not apply - can be expected
to incur various training or transaction costs which have to be incorporated in any assessment
of the welfare effects of the legislation. Firms following  the second route on the other hand may
not  incur  real  resource  costs but  will  of  course face possible punitive action if  they are
investigated.  The model allows for both possibilities.13
Firm Options
Assume a size distribution  of profit-maximizing  firms differentiated  by a productivity
parameter 01.10  We assume that 0i  is unobservable and has a cumulative distribution G(O)  with
support  [0,!].  The govermnent  introduces  a minimum  wage  into this setting. Firms  have  three
options. First, pay the minimum. Second,  legally  avoid  the minimum  through  various  costly
actions  such  as subcontracting,  hiring  part-time  workers,  etc. And third, evade. The expected
payoffs  for each option  are:"
(1).
w(hereW);  if  comply
E  i-  (1-p)  x (0i w) +,s{7 (0i,  w)-r}  ;  if  evade
w^here
7  (Oi,  w)  -A;  if  avoid
7  (e 1 w)  = max  pOi F  (K, L)  - wL-r  K
K,  L
10  Because  we model  a single  production  technology,  the possibility  that labor  market  legislation  influences
choice  of technology  is not captnd.  While  potentially  important,  it is not obvious  that labor  market
legislation  by itself  is likely  to be a main  determinant  of technology  choice.
The  formulafion  for the payoff  under  evasion  reflects  beginning  of period  inspection  and the fact  that
the model  deals  with an instant  in time. During  that instant,  a  otential  evader  either  ends  up evading
for the entire instant  or being  caught  on suspicion  as it were and  both complying  and paying  the penalty
for the entire instant.14
and w is the market wage; w is the minimum  wage; 3 the probability  of inspection;  r the
penalty; and A the fixed cost associated  with avoidance.' 2 We assume throughout  that w >
w and define  units in such a way that w and w incorporate  non-wage  benefits  as well.
From (1), firms  will evade  rather  than comp[y  if
(3)
7C (Oi  ,  w)  - X  (Oi  , w)  >  _Pr
and will evade  rather than avoid if
(4)
7c  tai,  w)  - n  <i  A  W1  pr
We know  from (2) and the envelope  theorem  that the derivative  of the left hand side (LHS)  of
the above inequalities  with respect  to 0; is positive  for  w >  w.  Given the direction  of the
12  Both  r  and A could  be made  functions  of employmet. Consider,  for example,  A(L) = AL and F (L)
=  1L.  In the case  of A, the transactions  costs  could  simply  be treated  as an exua wage cost  per
worker. This would  then  influence  the FOC for labor  demand  and yield  a payoff  from avoidance  of
z(61,w-A).  In the case of r,  the penalty could be imposed on the number of workers employed when
the firm evades. Labor  demand  under  evasion  becomes  L(e 1,w+Xf). The payoff  from evasion  can
then  be expressed  as (l-3)ir(9,,w+9r) +  0[ar(OI,f)  - r  L(9,,w+j)].  The payoff  from compliance
remains  unchanged. Since  these  payoffs  make  direct  compansons  of outcomes  more  problematic,  we
proceed  with  the setup  described  in the main  text for simplicity.15




From inequality  (5), the likelihood  that finns will evade rather than avoid increases  as
the cost of avoiding  (A) increases. It also increases  relative  to both compliance  and avoidance
as the probability  of inspection  ,B  and the size  of the penalty  r increase.  Assuniing  inequality  (5)
holds, denote  the values  of O;  which satisfy  (3) and (4) with equality  as Oc  and OA, respcively.
Then firms with  0, <  Or  comply;  those with  0c <  9. <  OA  evade; and those  with  OA <  9i  avoid
(see Figure 1). In other words, low-productivity  firms will tend to comply;  high-productivity
ones will tend to avoid; and those in the middle  range will evade." 3 14 If, on the othr  hand,
13  It should  be noted  that  in our paper  we model  an economy  with  a single  technology  where  differences
in firm size  stem  only  from productivity  differences.  In reality,  of course, firms  differ  in size because
of technological  as well as productivity differences  (i.e., unproductive firms making petrochemicals  tend
to be larger  than  productive  ones  making  garments). Our  model  is therefore  consistent  with an
empirical  observation  that larger firms  tend  to comply  while  smaller  ones  evade  in an economy  with
multiple  sectors  and technologies.
14  For a given production  technology, we could also consider the implications  of allowing  the probability
of inspection  to be higher  for larger  firms, i.e., let 0 be strictly  increasing  in O1. Both  the LHS and
RHS of inequality  (3) will  be increasing  in 0i. If the RHS  term still intersects  the LHS  from above,
then the analysis  is unchanged  and we still  have  a picture  similtr to Figure 1. If  t  is so low for small
firms and increases so sharply in 9, that it intersects  the L[S  from below, however, then the smallest
firms-those with 9, 5  OC-wil instead be evaders.  Firms with 0  >  Oc  will comply rather  than  avoid if
ir(O,,w)  - ir(0 1,w) S  A. Denote the 9, which sets this to equality as 0A.  For A sufficiently  large, we
thefore  get the result that firns  with 01 S  Oc  evade, those with 61<  <  6  <  OA comply, and those with
8; >  OA avoid.  While potentially more attractive, note that this pattem of firm behaviour requires
strong assumptions  on the shape of P.  In the absence of additional information  on regulator behaviour,
we maintain  the simplifring assumption  that P is constant. The qualitative results carry through.16
inequality (5) does not hold, then there will be no evaders and firms will either comply or avoid
with the choice dcpending on a comparison between the difference in profits -- the LHS of
inequalities (3) and (4)) -- and A, the fixed, transactions cost.  For the remainder of the paper,
we assume that inequality (5) holds since this is the more interesting case.
-x(e 
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Regulator Ontions
Inequality (3) shows that the regulator can infuence the degree of compliance through
two variables - the probability of inspection, and the severity of the penalty. Other things equal,
the regulator can minmize noncompliance  by increasing these  two variables. The regulator can
also influence the composition  of noncompliance  (see inequality  (4)).  But here the regulator has
an additional  instrment  for  determining the  split between evasion and avoidance - the17
precision  and comprehensiveness  of the relevant  labor  legislation.  This works  through  the fixed
transactions  cost, A.  As loopholes  in the legislation  are progressively  closed, so the transaction
costs associated  with avoidance  are likely  to increase. This will reduce  avoidance  relative  to
evasion (but leave non-compliance  unchanged)  whereas increases  in 0 and r will  increase
avoidance  relative  to evasion  (and reduce  overall  non-compliance).
Takdng  stock  of these results,  we conclude:
*  Increases in the probability of  inpection  ,8 raise 6c  and lower 0A.  JIM
proportion of finns complying  and avoiding increases, while the proportion
evading  decreases. Increases  in the per frm penalty r have a similar  effect.
*  Increases  in the specificity  of the labor legisdation  raise  OA. The proportion  of
fins  avoiding  decreases  and the proportion  of firms evading  incrases.
Although  the regulator  has  sufficient  instruments  to eliminate  evasion  and avoidance,  the
empirical  evidence  makes  clear that  regulators  choose  not to do this. This in turn must reflect
both  the objectives  of the regulator  and the costs of enforcement.  Depending  on the objective,
the real costs associated  with avoidance  may also influence  the regulator's  view of the relative
merits  of evasion  and avoidance. As noted  earlier,  facual information  on enforcement  costs  and
an understanding  of regulator  strategy  are interesting  areas for future  research.
Labor  Market  Outcomes
We are now in a position  to examine  the first proposition  of this paper:  Does the
likelihood  of non-compliance  increase  as the (binding)  minimum  wage inceases and as the
elasticity  of labor demand  increases? We first establish  that this is indeed  so.  Second,  we
derive  the circumstances  in which  an increase  in a binding  minimnum  wage results  in increased18  I
demand for labor.  And third,  we discuss the implications of these results for the efficiency
losses arising from labor market regulation.
Consider expression (3) defined with equality.  Because the LHS is increasing in both
w and 0, an increase in w  will therefore decrease  c.'IS  To get at the impact of changes in
elasticity, we conduct a second-order Taylor series expansion on the LHS of (3) around (w,o:).
With some manipulation, this yields
(6)
L(w,8c)  (i-w)  1  L(w,c)  w-
where e  <  0 is labor elasticity.  Note that this is increasing in the absolute value of e as well
as in 0, since aL/ae  2  0.  An increase in the absolute value of e therefore implies a decrease
in Oc. Thus, the likelihood of noncompliance  does increase with both the minimum wage and
the elasticity of demand for labor.
We now examine the effect of an increase in the minimum  on labor demand. Total labor
dermLand  LD(.) is given by
W7)  L  sD(.  o)  em r  ts  f  y ug  th  iep  ft(ii,  w)  dGn(t)  de
We can also demonstrate  this fonnally  using  the implicit  funcfion  t1teorem.19
where the first integral  corresponds  to complying  firms  and the second  to noncomplying  ones.
After some  manipulation  and simplification,  the effect  on labor demand  of increasing  w is given
by
(8)
-Oc  (L(0c,w)  - L(ec,  W)  )  + fc8aL(0,W)  dG  (0)  dO
where 6jF is the partial of Oc  with respect to w.
This result fits with intuition.  The product of the first two terms is positive and
represents the increase in the proportion of non-complying  firms (recall that 9,c is negative)
multiplied by the increase in labor demand  as (each) firm switches from compliance  to non-
compliance. The integral  is negative  and captures  the decrease  in labor demand  from complying
firms - those in the interval  from r[, 0 c]  - due to higher minimum wages.  Since the latter term
is a second-order  effect compared  to the former, (8) could well be positive and an increase in
the minimum wage could increase labor demand  due to lower compliance.  However, this
depends upon the size of the gap between  the minimum  and market wages.  The expression  is
likelier to be positive  the greater the gap between  minimum  and market wages since L(Oc,w)  -
L(OC,w)  is larger  and the proportion  of complying  firms  smaller. If the minimum  wage  is close
to the market  wage, however,  then the proportion  of complying  firms  is large and the expression
is likely to be negative since the effect of decreased labor demand among compliers will
dominate. We therefore  have a Laffer-curve  type relationship  between  the minimum  wage  and
laoor demand due to incomplete  compliance. This contrasts  markedly  with the outcome  in a20
world  of complete  compliance,  where raising  the minimum  wage  unambiguously  lowers labor
demand  and increases  unemployment.
What  are the implications  of these  results  for the efficiency  losses  usually  associated  with
labor regulations? There  are at least  three effects  of an increase  in minimum  wages  assuming
enforcement  costs remain  fixed: i) the increase  in the distortion  for complying  firms;  ii) the
reduction  in costs of distortions  as firms switch  from being compliers  to being noncompliers;
and iii) the increased  transaction  costs as firms switch  from being evaders to being avoiders.
The first  two arise immediately  from (8)  while  the third  derives  from expression  (4)  defined  with
equality.  1 6 As with labor demand,  these  results  imply  that efficiency  losses  could increase,  stay
constant, or fall as the minimum  is increased.  Moreover,  the likelihood  of a reduction  in
efficiency  losses  will increase  with the size of the existing  distortion  because,  as we saw above,
this is one of the factors  determining  the likelihood  of an increase  in labor  demand. This  points,
therefore,  to the existence  of natural  limits  on the magnitude  of efficiency  losses.
These results  have two clear implications  for policy. First, while the efficiency  losses
from compliance  can arguably  be justified  on equity  grounds  because  it results  in a tansfer to
workers,  it is unlikely  that govermnents  will be willing  to incur  the costs  (enforcement  costs  and
efficiency  losses) associated  with full compliance. There is likely to be therefore an optimal
degree of non-compliance. And second, since there are no compensating  equity gains from
avoidance  relative to evasion  and yet there are real resource  costs associated  with the former,
the optimum  should  be characterized  by zero avoiders. This suggests  that it is preferable  to
Because  the  LHS  of (4) is identical  to that  of (3),  an increase  in w reduces  AA  and  increases  avoidance.21
reduce legal avoidance rather than evasion."  This in turn requires a  greater focus on
tightening  legislation  to cut back  on legal  avoidance  rather  than outright  increases  in inspections
and penalties  per se.
IV.  INTRODUCING  PUBLIC ENTERrIRsEs
In this section  we examine  the impact  of labor market  regulations  on public  enterprises
which  we assume  operate  according  to a different  objective  function  and effectively  face  a looser
budget  constraint. We follow  the same  procedure  as before and first introduce  some  empirical
material  to substantiate  the basic argument  and then proceed  to a more formal  presentation.
The Facts
Fact 1:  Public enterprise (PE) employment  and wage bills have often grown very
rapidly in developing  countries.  After  a strong  increase  in PE employment  during the 1960s
and 1970s,  the share of PE employment  in total employment  has remained  relatively  constant
between  5 percent and 6 percent worldwide  between  1978  and 1991  (see  Table 3). But regional
differences  in PE employment  remain  large. Between  1986  and 1991,  the share of PEs in total
employment  in Africa was 18.1 percent, significantly  larger than the corresponding  share in
Latin  America  (3.7 percent)  and Asia  (4.7 percent). This share  was as high as 46.4 percent in
Niger, 45.3 percent in Senegal and 37.2 percent in Zambia.
Table  3:  Weighted  Average  Share  of Public  Enterprises  in Employment,  1978-91
(Percentage)
This has to be counterbalanced  with the fc  that  the avoiding  firns are larger  than  the evading  ones in
our setup and will therefore  incor  higher  distortionary  costs  from compliance.22
1979845  1986-9  1978-91
worid  S.SS  S.28  .4'
Latin America and Caribbean  4.07  3.67  3.90
Africa  17.55  18.07  17.77
Asia  4.92  4.68  4.82
Note:  Only a subset  of countries  within  each region  were used for deriving  World Averages. LAC Regional  Average
excludes  Argentina,  Brazil,  Ecuador,  Grenada,  Trinidad  and Tobago. Africa  Regional  Average  excludes  Burundi,
Cote D'lvoire.  Egypt,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Niger,  Senegal,  Seychelles  and  Tanzania. Asia  Regional  Average  excludes
Indonesia,  Myanmar,  Sri  Lanka  and  Vietnam.  3 year  moving  average  estimates  were  used  to complete  our time  series
in case  of missing  values  when  deriving  regional  averages.  Regional  Weighted  Averages  were  obtained  using  GDP
in current  U.S.  dollars  as weights.
Source: A. Galal,  Public  Enterprises  in Developing  Countries,  1994.
Even in those countries where real wages in the public sector have declined, these
reductions  bave  often  been  more than offset  by an increase  in public  sector  employment.  In her
study  on public sector  pay and employment  policies  Nunberg  found an excessive  wage bill to
be a major  problem  for the majority  of countries  where  the World  Bank  pursues  government  pay
and employment  interventions  (Nunberg,  1988).  In Egypt,  for example,  the wage  bill  grew from
22 percent of government  expenditures  in the mid 1970s  to 33 percent  in the late 1980s  (Banerji
and Sabot, 1993).
Fact 2:  Public enterprises are often asigned employment  goals, are required to act
as model employers, and may be required to serve as employers of last resort.  While
governments  seek  to protect  real wages  for workers,  when  this is not possible  they  may instead
attempt  to protect  employment  by (i) cutting  spending  on non-wage  items, (ii) compressing  the
wage structe,  and (iii) cutting  real wages.
Public enterprises  act as model employers  and seek to protect  workers  against  declines
in the wage  rate. In Morocco, overall  productivity  in formal  mnufacturing fell between  198523
:nd  1990. However, while the productivity decline was larger in the public sector, real wages
in the public sector rose 0.4 percent per year while they fell 2.3 percent in the private sector
even though the former were already higher to begin with (Harrison,  1993).  In Bangladesh,
five out of seven PEs sampled had increases in average labor costs which outpaced productivity
increases.  A PE producing steel billets and plates had increases in average labor costs of 55
percent between 1985 and 1992 while the value of output per worker actually fell by  18.6
percent. (World Bank, 1994)
When operating under tight financial constraints, however, governments may seek to
protect employment by reducing spending on material.  The ratio of wage to non-wage public
expenditures has been increasing in many countries with fiscal constraints, which indicates
growing distortions and imbalances  in the input mix of public sector production. In Liberia,  for
example, the wage bill in relation to revenues increased from 36 percent in 1977 to 66 percent
in 1981 (Lindauer, 1988).
The government may also compress the wage structure to protect cnployment of lower
paid  workers.  Lindauer, Meesook  and  Suebsaeng (1987) have  found  significant salary
compression for a number of African countries.  In Ethiopia, for example, whereas the lowest
real salaries in the public sector fell only by 37 percent between 1975 and 1985, real wages fell
by nearly 70 percent for those with the highest salaries (ILO,  1990). In Zambia the salary ratio
between the highest and lowest skilled civil service employee fell from 19.2 percent in 1970 to
6.9 percent in 1983 (see Lindauer, 1988).  As a consequence,  the wage difference for skldled
labor between private and public sectors has become  particularly high. For Venezuela, an ILO
study for 1985 found that top civil servants earned only about 40  percent to 80 percent of the24
wages  of managers  in private  enterprises.  In Thailand in 1982  the differential  for top positions
in both sectors  was as high as 350 percent  (Lindauer,  1988).
Lastly, since  there is a negative  tradeoff  between  employment  and the wage  bill when
governments  are fimancially  constrained,  governments  may resort to reducing  real wages to
protect  employment.  There has been  a considerable  reduction  in real wages  in Africa. Public
sector wages  for the lowest  salary  groups  fell by 45 percent  between  1975  and 1985,  whereas
the highest  salaries  in the public  sector  feli  by more  than  60 percent  in average  during  the same
period.  In SomaLia,  for instance,  the real value  of the lowest  salary  and  the highest  salary  in the
civil service  in 1985  were only 5.2 percent  and 4.0 percent  of their 1975 value,  respectively
([LO0,  1990).
Public  enterprises  may also be required  to act as employers  of last resort.  To reduce
unemployment,  govemments  often  guarantee  jobs and provide  funds to hiit  raduates  which
make  these  employees  cosdess  for PEs. In Egypt, such  a policy  has resulted  in the significant
overmanning  (Gelb  et. al., 1991).  Similar  employment  policies  are also  found  in Senegal,  Togo,
CAR, Guinea,  Mali and Sudan  where university  graduates  are automatically  hired by public
institutions.
Collectively,  the above  has  not  surprisingly  resulted  in considerable  overmannig among
PEs in many countries. A comparison  of public and private manufactuing  enterpnses  in
Turkey has shown  the existence  of significant  labor  and capital  surplus  among  the former: the
ratio of public to private labor and capital inputs per unit of output was 1.97 and 1.66,
respectively  (Gelb  et. al., 1991)."9  A study  of ministries  in a West  African  country  found  that
A. Gelb,  J. B. Knight,  R. Sabot,  Public  sector  employment,  rent  seeWing  and  economic  growth,  The
Economic  Joumal,  Sept.  1991,  pp. 1187  ff.25
6,000 of the total staff of 6,800 was redundant  (Ozgediz,  1983). Overmanning  in the public
sector  of Egypt was found  to be as high as 40 percent  in 1976. In part, this reflected  the
provision  of funds  to hire  graduates  which  made  these  employees  costless  for PEs  (Gelb,  1991).
As a consequence,  whereas  employment  in Egypt's  private  sector  grew only  by 7.8 percent,  it
rose  by 24.5  percent  in PEs  during  1976-86  (Banerji  and Sabot,  1993).  Overmanning  in  particular
sectors  is estimated  to be as high as 93 percent  in the spinning  industry  in Egypt,  54 percent  in
the transport  sector  of Ghana,  91 percent  in the Bombay  port of India, and 40 percent  in the
railways  sector  of Turkey  (Baneji and Sabot,  1993).
Fact 3: Public  enterprises  are frequently  not expected  to make  a profit. As indicated
above, non-economic  objectives  such as employment  or equity  appear  to outweigh  efficiency
considerations.  Not surprisingly,  this has made  PEs a significant  burden  on the govermment
budget.  Gross operating  profits of PEs in nearly all developing  countries  were significantly
negative  (Galal,  1994).  Negative  gross  operating  profits  were between  2 percent  and 3 percent
of GDP in Africa  and Asia  for the period  1978-91.  There  was little  or no improvement  during
the 1980s  in Asia or Africa. Only in Latin America  did gross operating  profits improve
significantly  between 1978 and 1991,  from negative  gross operating  profits of more than 1
percent  of GDP  between  1978  and 1985  to a small  surplus  between  1986  and 1991.
The Model
In contrast  to the pure  profit-maximzing  behavior  of the private  sector,  public  entprises
are assumed  to maximize  a modified  measure  of profits
(9)  x ( 1 ;i .w)  = max  p Oi F (,  L)  - wL  - rK
L26
where  X is an exogenously given measure reflecting the  net  influence of  a  concern with
employment generation  on the one hand and recognition  of the need for fiscal discipline on the
other.  If X equals one, the government has no special employment  objective and/or the fiscal
constraint dominates.  In this case, public enterprises are required to maximize profits.  With
a  more pressing national employment objective and a more relaxed fiscal situation, X may
approach zero, at which point labor becomes costless to  the enterprise.  This  will imply
overmanning and a drain on the central budget.  In exceptional circumstances, X could be
negative.  With this background, the remainder of this section discusses first, the question of
public enterprise compliance with  minimum wage regulations under  different institutional
arrangements, and then the relationship  between public enterprise compliance and efficiency.
Unlike private firms, the choices open to public enterprises with respect to labor market
regulations  may be more severely circumscribed. We can distinguish  three different institutional
arrangements.  First, there may be a cental  wage-fixing  and wage-paying  body which applies
to all public enterprises. In this case, PEs will comply  since they have no choice. Second,  each
public enterprise may have the capacity to choose between the minimum and the market wage,
but the effective penalty or probability of inspection  may be higher for public enterprises. If it
is easier for government  regulatory authorities  to ensure  payment of fines by public than private
firms, for example, the effective penalty r  will be higher for the former.  Recourse to non-
pecuniary measures-e.g.,  firing  of  public managers-could also result  in  higher effective
penalties for public  an  private firms.  Alternatively, the probability of inspection 0 could
differ.  Labor may be more  aware of  its rights in  a public enterprise or  have a  higher
expectation  that its grievances  will receive  due attention. If so, the frequency  of complaints, and27
hence  of inspections,  may  be greater  for  public  enterprises.  These  factors  increase  the likelihood
of compliance.
A final  possibility  is that the determination  of wage  payments  is left to the enterprise  as
before  but the effective  penalty  and probability  of inspection  are the same  for public  and private
firms. Since  this is the case  that offers  the most immediate  comparison  with  private  firms, we
pursue it here to see whether  public enterprises  are more likely to comply  than their private
counterparts. If the answer  is "yes" then, we know  that public  enterprises  are more  likely to
comply  than  private  firms  for  all institutional  arrangements  because  public  enterprise  compliance
will be lowest  for the particular  one under study.
To examine  this issue,  we note that the general  form  of the results  for PEs is identical
to that for private fms.  In particular, we can derive inequalities  similar  to (3) and (4) to
determine  whether  PEs will  comply,  evade,  or avoid. The only difference  is that the LHS  of
these  equalities  will reflect  the modified  objective  function:
(10)
Tr  (O1;  X W) - i  (Oi;  Aw)
In both cases the RHS is the same for PEs as for private  firms, and so, as before, we wiul
observe  evaders  among  public  enterprises  if inequality  (5) holds. In the following,  we assume
that it does hold.
These  similarities  (RHS)  and differences  (LHS)  allow  us to shed  light on whether  PEs
are more or less likely to comply  than private firms.  To see this, note that (i) the relevant28
margin is the compliance/evasion  one, and (ii) from (9), for X =  1, the private and public firm
problems are  identical.  Therefore, if (10) is decreasing in X, then we know that PEs -- for
which in general X <  1 -- will have less incentive  to evade and a greater incentive  to comply
than private firms.  19
Let L(w,O,;X)  solve (9). Then, (10), which reflects the incentive  to evade, can be written
as
(11)
-A [wL (w,  -WL(w,  . ) ]  + pGi  [ F  (K,L(w,  . ) )  - F  (X,L(w,  .)]
To assess  how the incentive  to evade  changes  with the degree of fiscal discipline  and the concem
with employment,  differentiate  (11) with respect to X. Using the envelope theorem, this yields
<-vL(v,.)  - w L(w,.). With inelastic  (elastic)  labor demand,  this expression  is positive (negative),
and the incentive  to evade decreases  (increases)  as the social concern with employment  increases
and/or fiscal discipline is relaxed and X  is reduced. Thus, PEs are more likely to comply with
minimum  wage legislation than their private sector counterparts  in situations  where the demand
for  labor  is  inelastic.  Empirical estinates  of  the  wage elasticity of  labor  demand in
manufacturing  typically produce absolute values well below one,20  indicating that in general
PEs are indeed more likely to comply with labor market regulations  than private firms even
when confronted with the same regulatory  enviroment.
Ceteris  varibus,  obviously. In  particular, his  holds  for a given  0,.
20  See, for example,  the estimates  provided  in Tables  7 and 8 in Bell  (1994)  or in Table 10 in Revenga
(1994).29
If PEs  are more  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage  legislation  than  private  firms, then
is it the case that efficiency  losses  are greater  for  PEs? Here we show  that the factor  that leads
to the result  on compliance  also  has  implications  for  the efficiency  impact.  To see this, consider
the relationship  between  PE compliance  and labor  demand. The FOC for a complying  PE is
given  simply  by
EipFL  (K,  L)  =  I  w
while  that for an equivalent  non-complying  private  firm is given by the same  LHS  expression
set equal  to w.  Denote  the latter  solution  as L.  The  complying  PE therefore  hires less (more)
labor  than LI if X 2  w/w (X <  wiX).2 1 This  reflects  the fact that X  and w exert opposing
forces  on labor  demand  - X increases  labor  demand  while  w reduces  it.
Evaluated  purely  from the standpoint  of productive  efficiency,  it appears  reasomable  to
assume  that efficiency  losses increase  the further  away L is from L?.  It follows  that the
introduction  of a minimum  wage  could  reduce  efficiency  losses  for complying  public  enterprises
as they move from a situation of excess labor demand  to one closer to the free-market
equilibrium  (see Figure  2).  Thus, X < w/w is sufficient  but not necessary  for compliance  by
PEs to reduce efficiency  losses.2 3 This is in marked contrast with private firms, where
Since  w > w >  0, w/w E  (0,1)  while  X ranges  from  11,-co),  we know  that  there  exists  a critical
value 1'  = w/w.
Evaluating  this from  a welfare  standpoint  requines  an assesent  in terms  of the alternative  PE
objective  fimction.
PE compliance  does  not always  reduce  efficiency  losses  because  such  firms  could  end up hiring  so
fewer  workers  that efficiency  losses  are greatr than  under  non-compliance.  Recall  that for )  = I
public  enterprise  behavior  is identical  to private  firm  behavior. Since  we know  that  compliance  results
in efficiency  losses  for private  firms,  we know  that  public  enterprise  compliance  at X =  I results  in30
compliance increases  efficiency  losses. This has noteworthy  implications  for policy.  It suggests
that from the standpoint  of improving  compliance, it is preferable to focus on public rather than
private enterprises since there are less likely to be increased  efficiency losses to offset gains in
equity from greater compliance.
Wage
w
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V.  ANALYZING  LABOR  MA  REGULATIONS:  A CHECKLIST
Based  on  the  preceding analysis,  the  following checklist provides  a  means for
heuristically  evaluatmg  the likely  distortionary  impact  of minimum  wage regulations. Where  the
efficiency  loses.31
preliminary evaluation suggests significant distortionary costs, further research and analysis
would be called for.
i)  Check whether the legislated minimum is potentially binding.  As empirical
studies demonstrate, minimum  wages are not likely to have significant  employment or other
effects if they do not "bite."  One helpful exercise would  be to consider the relationship  of the
minimum  wage to the wage distribution. Wage histograms  which  spike at or near the minimum
wage rather dtan significandy  to the right would indicate situations where such minima have
more bite.  Such histograms  for Morocco  differentiated  by firm size, indicate,  for example, that
minimum  wages are considerably  less binding for larger than smaller firms.  Similarly, the fact
that only 6 percent and 24 percent of firms had average wages below 1.5 and 2 times the
minimum  respectively in Mexico, while 27 percent and 71 percent  did so in Colombia indicates
that  minimum wages potentially had  more bite  in  the  latter. 24 While  this  will give  a
preliminary indication, in practice there may be several complications. For example, there may
be several legislated  minima  corresponding  to different sectors  or classes  of firms. Furthermore,
since the total return to labor includes  both wage and non-wage  elements, simple comparisons
of average to legislated minimum  wages may not capture the true extent to which such minima
are binding.
ii)  If  the  legislated minimum is  potentially effective, check the  extent of
noncompliance. To arrive at a quick  assessment  of the extent  of compliance,  it would be useful
to interview the relevant staff in the country's Department  of Labor.  Their assessment of the
situation  could be supplemented  with data on the size of the enforcement  budget, the mmber of
inspectors and prosecutions, and the severity of fines.  It would also be useful to check the
Data  are for 1989  in Mexico  and 1987  in Colombia  from Bell  (1994).32
relevant legislation to establish the scope for easy and legal avoidance through such means as
use of temporary workers, apprentices, or subcontracting.  As a crosscheck, a small survey of
selected enterprises in different segments (private/public, formal/informal)  would be desirable.
In addition  to government administrative  capacity, strong labor unions and judicial systems may
also play an important role in determnining  the effectiveness of enforcement.  In Ecuador and
Morocco, for example, unions reportedly act as  important channels for the transmission of
complaints regarding violations of labor regulations.  In the  United States,  many cases of
violations are taken directly by plaintiffs to court without the involvement  of the Department of
Labor.
iii)  If the legislated minimum is binding and enforced,  check the relative sizes of
the public and private  sectors.  If the private sector predominates, then the evidence already
compiled provides a basis for concluding that distortionary costs are potentially significant and
that further analysis is required. If, on the other hand, the public sector predominates, one more
test is required because in this case the efficiency impact depends on the net strength of the
employment objective and the fiscal constraint X . One indication of this is the extent of net
financial flows from government to public enterprises.  High figures could indicate a  looser
fiscal constraint.  For example, as a proportion of GDP, these figures were 2.5 percent for
Argentina, but  -12.1  percent for Chile;  and 16.6  percent for Algeria, but  -6  percent  for
Egypt.25  In the event that PEs appear to operate like profit-maximizing  private firms, then, as
with private frms,  the evidence would point to potentially significant  efficiency  losses and would
call for firther  investigation.
Data are for 1978-91  and from Galal (1994).33
To conclude, we return to the opening quote from Freeman.  In our checklist we have
set out three conditions  that would have to be fulfilled  before we would expect to see significant
distortions associated  with legislated wage  minima. Its our presumption  that in many developing
countries these conditions  are unlikely to be fulfilled. If this is true, then Freeman's surprise
at the lack of evidence regarding the distortionary  costs of minimum  wages is explained,  at least
as far as broad, cross-country  comparisons  are concerned. Such costs could, however, still be
significant in some countries at some times.34
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